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Abstract—Video traffic, which represents an increasing frac-
tion of the Internet traffic, requires end-to-end quality of service
(QoS) guarantees for inter-domain routing. However, providing
such guarantees remains a challenge essentially because it re-
quires a strong and fair cooperation among the different network
operators or Autonomous Systems (ASes), crossed by the traffic.
Having a single AS on the path that does not meet its QoS
engagement is sufficient to violate the end-to-end QoS guarantees.
Unfortunately, the client is not capable of distinguishing unfair
ASes from honest ones at the time it selects its path. Reputation
mechanisms turn out to be very efficient tools to estimate how
trustworthy and reliable entities can be without requiring the help
of any central authority. They are effective to foster cooperation
by remedying selfishness. In this position paper, we identify the
main properties a reputation mechanism should meet to improve
inter-domain QoS routing, and we provide a coarsed-grain vision
of the design of such a mechanism.
Keywords—Inter-Domain Path Computation; Quality of Ser-
vice; Routing; Reputation Mechanism; Distributed Systems
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the main barriers to the deployment of end-to-end
quality of service (QoS) guarantees over the Internet is the
necessity for different operators – or Autonomous Systems
(AS) – to cooperate. Indeed end-users are in general not
connected to the same operator and all operators involved in
the communication between these two parties must promise
and deliver the desired QoS.
Several mechanisms have been proposed to enable the com-
putation of inter-domain constrained paths [3], [4], [16]. The
proposed algorithms compute such paths with QoS constraints
expressed with additive metrics such as delay or cost. They
assume that every AS is willing to contribute to the best of
their ability for the constrained path, and focus solely on the
path computation issue. However, the successful establishment
of a path does not mean that the different entities involved
on this path will behave as announced, or that the promised
QoS will be delivered. These failures can either result from
unexpected changes in the underlying networks (e.g. a link
failure or an unexpected increase in traffic) or from malicious
behaviors, that is non-cooperative parties.
One possibility to detect unreliable paths is to rely on rep-
utation mechanisms, which help identify ASes that frequently
renege on the QoS they guarantee. Reputation mechanisms
tend to be an effective tool to encourage trust and cooperation
in distributed systems in which entities (i.e. users, domains,
operators) exhibit a rational behavior [8]. By providing the
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means to rate each involved entity, a reputation mechanism
aggregates these ratings, and derives publicly available repu-
tation scores computed with a well-specified function. Hence,
entities gaining a good reputation are those providing correct
services to the others, and honoring the commitments they
made. Reputation mechanisms have already been proposed
to harness the local knowledge of a given AS in order to
determine whether they can trust their neighbors [15], but, to
the extent of our knowledge, none has been proposed to collect
the system knowledge about reliable – and unreliable – paths.
In their highly competitive environment, it is likely that
a non-negligible set of ASes will try to deceive their clients,
either through collusion or not; they may also try to attract
more traffic than they can reasonably provide, or gain a
particular type of traffic. When an AS fails to respect its
engagements, it is important that end-users be aware of such
a failure in order to choose reliable routing paths with QoS
promises. However, reliably and correctly distinguishing fair
ASes from unfair ones is a real challenge. The reason stems
from the fact that each AS has a clear incentive to put the
blame on the other ASes in order to avoid the negative conse-
quences of its failures. Even though each AS corresponds to a
well-identified company, unfair behaviors do exist. Therefore,
providing a usable mechanism capable of discouraging ASes
from promising attractive QoS guarantees that will not be
respected, and preventing ASes from shifting the blame for
their own failures to others is mandatory for the welfare of
inter-domain routing.
In this article, we present the main features reputation
mechanisms can offer to inter-domain QoS routing in order
to produce an environment where trust thrives between ASes
and end-users. Our solution relies on a combination of different
research areas. Specifically, Section II introduces the current
state-of-the-art of building network path between several do-
mains, while guaranteeing QoS constraints. Section III presents
the required properties when using a reputation mechanism in
the aforementioned context. Section IV provides the coarsed-
grain design of such a reputation mechanism. Finally, we
discuss threats and perspectives of reputation mechanisms in
Section V.
II. MECHANISM TO COMPUTE THE INTER-DOMAIN
QOS-GUARANTEED PATH
The ever-growing appetite of users for watching videos,
doing video conferences, or even gaming over the Internet
stresses network capacities. Cisco pointed out in a recent study
that video will represent 80 % of the traffic on Internet in
2019 [6]. This evolution stresses the need for QoS guarantees
for a non-negligible portion of Internet communications. Al-
though mechanisms have been standardized and are already de-
ployed, there is still no end-to-end QoS offers. One important
obstacle lies in the structure of the Internet, which is composed
of a multitude of independent and rational ASes that, so far,
do not have sufficient incentives to cooperate in order to create
end-to-end QoS offers.
The simple interaction model that has been considered so
far is the following one: an application or a user formulates
a request for a QoS-guaranteed path between a source S and
a destination D. Besides, ASes propose QoS offers, expressed
as a vector of metrics, that they are able to satisfy between
a pair of their border routers. The inter-domain mechanism
is distributed and combines those offers to provide possible
end-to-end QoS-guaranteed paths between the source and the
destination, which can then be selected by the source. This
model has a limitation: in order to provide end-to-end QoS-
guaranteed paths between a source S and a destination D, every
AS involved in those paths must participate and announce QoS
offers. To ensure that a significant number of ASes are willing
to participate, a revenue is associated to the fulfillment of the
request. The issues on revenue sharing between the ASes are
addressed in [1] and [7].
Authors of [9] and [10] propose a mechanism allowing to
find an end-to-end QoS-guaranteed path within the Internet
without requiring to identify the sequence of ASes between S
and D beforehand. The Internet being currently made of more
than 50,000 ASes, it is not conceivable to solicit each AS to
identify all the feasible paths. Therefore, the authors propose to
limit the path exploration by considering all the ASes located
in the neighborhood of a given path between S and D (e.g.
the regular BGP path between S and D). They define the
neighborhood and show the scalability of their mechanism,
while taking advantage of the path diversity offered by the
enlargement of the considered subset of ASes.
Specifically, the computation of the path is performed in a
distributed manner by the Path Computation Elements (PCE)
available in each AS. The main interest of a PCE is its
knowledge of the routing plan of the AS, its ability to perform
complex optimization calculations and to communicate with
other PCEs, located either in the same AS or in neighboring
ASes. The computation is made of three main phases. In
the first phase, S sends the request to its PCE, that will
forward it to the PCE in the destination AS. In the second
phase, the PCE in D’s domain initiates the possible path
computation. At the end of this phase, the source receives
a tree representing the concatenated candidate paths from S
to D. Note that for confidentiality issue, only the AS border
routers are represented in the structure. In the third phase, the
source enumerates the possible path and chooses one according
to its own criterion; for instance, in the network described in
Figure 1, the possible paths could be (AS1,AS4,AS6,AS8)
and (AS1,AS2,AS4,AS5,AS8). This concludes the path com-
putation. Although the failure of the path establishment is an
acceptable outcome (e.g. when the needed resources are no
longer available), a failure after the path establishment, i.e.
during its exploitation, is unacceptable and has to be avoided.
The following section describes the properties required to
integrate a reputation mechanism between the path establish-
ment and its exploitation.
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Figure 1. Network layers of our proposal. The first layer corresponds to the
existing links between the ASes, the second one to the chosen path ≺ S,D .
The final layer corresponds to the DHT organizing the score managers of ASes;
AS8 and AS6 are the score managers of AS4, etc.
III. WHICH PROPERTIES SHOULD BE PROVIDED BY A
REPUTATION MECHANISM TO COPE WITH INTER-DOMAIN
QOS ROUTING FEATURES?
Reputation mechanisms have proven to be useful in multi-
ple contexts, including electronic commerce applications [18].
These mechanisms provide a reputation score to each provider
based on its past experiences. In our context, reputation scores
should help end-users to select the right path of ASes to reach
the desired destination with the required QoS. A reputation
score is a value that reflects the opinion of clients during their
past transactions with a provider. Different pieces of informa-
tion can be taken into account by the reputation mechanism
to compute precise reputation scores, including for example
the importance given to recent feedback with respect to old
ones (see [11] for a comprehensive survey of reputation score
computation functions).
A. System Model
The system is composed of entities that can be of two
types: end-users, i.e. sources and destinations, and ASes.
In the following, we denote by S and D the two involved
end-users. We suppose that S and D have computed a path
consisting of n ASes (AS1, . . . ,ASn), and that they wish to
compute this path’ reputation before using it. Once this path
has been used, they want to rate it to testify whether the ASes
delivered the promised QoS or not. We call transaction the path
exploitation between S and D for which the ASes promised
QoS guarantees; we call interaction the whole exchange which
allows S to verify the reputation and D to rate the path after
the transaction.
The reputation of the path is a combination of the reputa-
tion scores of its ASes: it is computed from all the ratings
issued on the ASes. In this work, we do not specify the
reputation function used to compute reputation scores: our
reputation mechanism may use any such function, for instance
the one proposed by Anceaume et al. [2].
After the message exchange, the destination is able to
observe the QoS delivered, and to compare it with the promised
one. Note that D is not able to determine which AS – possibly
ASes – did not respect their commitment. The only information
is that the whole path did not deliver the promised QoS.
Therefore, if the actual QoS delivered is not sufficient, D must
issue the same negative rating on all the ASes of the path, and
the same positive one if the delivered QoS was correct.
B. Security Properties
An important aspect of reputation mechanisms is their
aptitude to defend against various types of attacks; one of the
most severe one is the manipulation of ratings and, worse,
of reputation scores. Vulnerability to such attacks severely
discredits the soundness of reputation mechanisms. Defend-
ing against those attacks comes down to guaranteeing the
unforgeability of ratings and reputation scores, as well as to
ensuring the undeniability of ratings. Briefly, the unforgeability
of ratings states that an entity cannot arbitrarily create (i.e.
“forge”) a rating that is not related to a legitimate transaction,
while the unforgeability of a reputation score means that such
a score is computed exclusively from the set of ratings received
by the concerned AS. The undeniability of ratings stipulates
that, if a couple ≺ S,D  computes and exploits a given path,
then D must be allowed to issue a rating, in the sense that
no AS on the path can intentionally block D’s rating. More
formally, these security properties are expressed as follows.
Property 1 (Ratings unforgeability). Consider a rating r
from ≺ S,D  on (AS1, . . . ,ASn). If at least one of those
(n + 2) entities is honest, then this rating was issued from a
legitimate transaction, and was chosen by D.
Property 2 (Reputation scores unforgeability). The reputa-
tion score exhibited by an AS is computed exclusively from
every rating this AS has received so far.
Property 3 (Ratings undeniability). If ≺ S,D  computes
and exploits the path composed of (AS1, . . . ,ASn), then D is
always able to issue a rating on (AS1, . . . ,ASn).
Those three properties guarantee that the reputation mech-
anism uses legitimate ratings to compute the reputation scores;
ASes can then use those reputation scores without modifying
them. However, the reputation engine itself is a target of
attacks. Dellarocas presents two major attacks against them,
called ballot-stuffing and bad-mouthing [8]. To carry out a
ballot-stuffing attack, a client issues numerous positive ratings
about a single provider in order to increase this provider’s
reputation; bad-mouthing attacks are similar, except that clients
issue negative ratings instead of positive ones. A solution to
prevent such attacks is to guarantee the linkability of rat-
ings [5], [14], which allows to detect that two ratings issued on
a given provider were issued by the same client. The reputation
engine can thus detect a single client issuing numerous ratings
on a given provider, and can appropriately manage the ratings
of the ballot-stuffing attack. This is described by Property 4. In
our case, the ratings are issued by two clients: the source and
the destination; instead of only the client, the couples ≺ S,D 
must thus be publicly linkable.
Property 4 (Ratings linkability). Two ratings from the same
couple ≺ S,D  on a given path are publicly linkable.
We previously explained that end-users cannot know which
ASes managed to deliver the promised QoS, and which failed
to do so. Consequently, we must guarantee that a couple of
end-users consistently rates the ASes of the used path: all ASes
must receive the same rating.
Property 5 (Ratings consistency). Consider a couple ≺ S,
D  exploiting a path (AS1, . . . ,ASn) and issuing ratings
(r1, . . . , rn). Then, the value of all the ratings must be identi-
cal, that is
ri = rj , ∀1 6 i, j 6 n.
IV. A REPUTATION MECHANISM FOR INTER-DOMAIN
QOS ROUTING
We now present the main design principles that a reputation
mechanism should provide to allow a source and a destination
to choose an inter-domain path based on both the promised
QoS and the reputation of the path. We first present a solution
guaranteeing the integrity of ratings, and briefly describe solu-
tions to the security properties. We finally detail an interaction
between a source, a destination, and the chosen ASes.
A. Securely Storing Ratings
Guaranteeing the unforgeability of ratings (Prop. 1) is an
essential feature of reputation mechanisms to guarantee that
no illegitimate ratings can be issued. However, this property
does not ensure the integrity of ratings once they have been
issued. More precisely, the storage of ratings must be secure.
Similarly to EigenTrust [12] and to the mechanism proposed
by Anceaume et al. [2], we preconize to rely on a Distributed
Hash Table (DHT) to guarantee the integrity of ratings and
allow entities to efficiently contact a given entity’s neighbors.
More precisely, we assume that the ASes are randomly
organized in a DHT like Chord [19]. The k closest neighbors
of a given AS are its score managers: they store the ratings
concerning this AS – that is, the j-th score manager of ASi
stores the set Ri,j – and send it to any querying end-user.
A querying end-user accepts a set of ratings Ri,j only if at
least dk/2e score managers have returned it. Thus, in order
to modify an AS’s ratings, a collusion must include at least
a majority of this AS’s score managers. Therefore, the DHT
allows to efficiently and securely obtain the ratings concerning
a given AS. Figure 1 describes the three network layers: the
links between ASes, the path chosen by ≺ S,D , and the
DHT; to obtain the reputation of path (AS1,AS4,AS6,AS8),
S contacts the score managers of those four ASes, that is AS2,
AS3, AS5, AS6, AS7, and AS8.
The number of necessary score managers depends on the
system parameters and on the desired maximal probability of
collusion. For instance, consider a system of 50,000 ASes,
including 5 % of malicious ones, where a collusion of half or
more score managers may modify an AS’s reputation; in this
case, guaranteeing a probability of collusion less than 2−64,
requires for each AS to have 49 score managers. This number
is given by the hypergeometric distribution, and this analysis
is detailed in [13, Appendix A].
B. Guaranteeing the Security Properties
In order to guarantee the security properties previously de-
fined, classical solutions include signature schemes for both the
unforgeability and the undeniability of ratings and reputation
scores. Signature schemes allow entities to sign messages, and
guarantee that no one except the legitimate owner of a (secret)
signing key sk is able to output a signature on any message,
which is valid with the corresponding (public) verification key
vk.
More specifically, in order to guarantee the unforgeability
of ratings, each entity involved in a transaction – that is, S,
D, and the ASes (AS1, . . . ,ASn) – must all sign a random
identifier of the transaction. Since signatures are unforgeable,
the adversary cannot output valid illegitimate ratings. To
guarantee that the destination’s rating is not modified, D must
additionally sign it.
The undeniability of ratings states that the destination must
always be able to rate the ASes after the transaction, whatever
the malicious behavior of ASes. As explained previously,
issuing a rating requires signatures from the involved ASes on
an identifier of the transaction. Hence, to ensure Property 3,
the destination must have access to the ASes’ signatures after
the transaction.
Since the source and the destination are not anonymous,
linking the ratings is easy: if multiple ratings were issued by a
given couple ≺ S,D  on the same AS, the reputation engine
can keep only the latest ratings from this couple in order to
prevent ballot-stuffing or bad-mouthing attacks.
The consistency of ratings means that when a couple
≺ S,D  rates a path (AS1, . . . ,ASn), the ratings on all
ASes must have the same value. To guarantee this consistency
property, the score managers of all ASes involved in an inter-
action can synchronize between themselves using a consensus
algorithm [17] to ensure that they all accept the same rating.
C. Setup of the Entities
During an interaction, entities need cryptographic keys and
identifiers. We also assume a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)
which certifies those keys and identifiers. Specifically, end-
users need an identifier idu and a signature key pair (sku, vku),
which are both certified with certu, while the ASes possess
an identifier and a signature key pair, also certified: ASi has
idAS and (skASi , vkASi), certified with certASi . Any signature
scheme can be used.
In the following, we assume that entities have authenticated
each other using the PKI; that is, they know each other’s public
key and can thus verify the signatures.
D. Reputation Mechanism
An interaction between S, D, and (AS1, . . . ,ASn) proceeds
in four steps. First, S contacts the score managers of each of
the n ASes to obtain their ratings and computes the reputation
score. The source and the destination then prepare themselves
for the transaction by guaranteeing that D will be able to
issue a rating. After the transaction, D is thus able to rate the
ASes. Finally, the score managers of the n ASes synchronize
themselves to take the rating into account.
As explained in Section IV-A, S contacts the score man-
agers of each of the ASes of path (AS1, . . . , ASn) to compute
its reputation score. The score managers of ASi reply with
their set of ratingsRi,j issued on ASi, which they sign in order
to prevent any modification. S accepts a set of ratings Ri as
soon as half or more score managers have returned it. S then
computes the reputation of the path fromR = ⋃16i6nRi; any
reputation engine can be used to do so. Once S has computed
the reputation scores of all available paths, it can choose the
one to use.
The preparation to the transaction is done in three steps,
as described in Figure 2.
S AS1 · · · ASn D
1. rS, idAS1 , . . . , idASn , σ
∗
S
2. rD, σD
3. idtrans, σS idtrans, σS, {σASi}i
Figure 2. Preparation to the transaction
First, S chooses a nonce rS – i.e. a random number different
for each transaction –, signs this nonce and the identifiers of
the (n+ 2) entities by computing
σ∗S = Sign
(
vkS, H(idS, idD, idAS1 , . . . , idASn , rS)
)
,
where H is a hash function such as SHA-256, and sends
the nonce, the chosen path (idAS1 , . . . , idASn), and the signa-
ture to the destination. If the signature is valid, D chooses
its own nonce rD, computes the identifier of transaction
idtrans = H(idS, idD, idAS1 , . . . , idASn , rS, rD), and signs it with
σD = Sign(vkD, idtrans). D then sends those elements to the
source. If σD is valid, S computes the identifier of transaction
and signs it with σS = Sign(vkS, idtrans). The source then sends
idtrans and σS to the first AS, which also signs the identifier
of transaction with σAS1 = Sign(vkAS1 , idtrans). It then sends
idtrans and the two signatures to the second one, and similarly
until the message has reached ASn. This AS finally sends
idtrans, σS and the ASes’ signatures {σASi}i to D. Once D has
confirmed it to S, they can proceed to the transaction itself.
After the transaction, D can observe the provided QoS and
issue a rating, which is positive if this QoS is consistent with
the promised one, and negative otherwise. To do so, D chooses
a rating ρ and signs it with σρ = Sign
(
skD, H(idtrans, ρ)
)
.
Finally, D sends the following elements to the score managers
of the n ASes:
idS, idD, {idASi}i, idtrans, σS, {σASi}i, σρ.
With those elements, D is able to prove that (i) the source
chose the path of ASes with σS, (ii) the ASes agreed to route
the message, with the signatures {σASi}i on idtrans, (iii) the
destination chose the rating ρ, with σρ.
Finally, the ASes’ score managers synchronize themselves
to take this rating into account. As explained in Section IV-B,
all the score managers of the n involved ASes synchronize to
ensure that D issues a unique rating on the n ASes.
V. DISCUSSIONS AND PERSPECTIVES
In this article, we proposed a method allowing end-users
to evaluate to what extent they can trust the QoS promised by
ASes, and thus to better evaluate the reliability of routing paths.
The reputation mechanism proposed is directly integrated
within the path computation. Furthermore, our proposition is
scalable thanks to the use of efficient tools, such as the DHT,
and the overhead is low: each user only needs to sign few
messages.
Our proposal associates reputation scores to routing paths
in order to help end-users. However, since end-users cannot
observe the behavior of individual ASes, reputation scores
cannot be extremely precise: if an AS is faulty, every AS
of the used path receives a negative rating, which is not
necessarily representative of their behavior. Improving this
requires measuring elements that would be able to detect
precisely which AS did not deliver the promised QoS, and
which did. Thus reputation mechanisms could also assist inter-
domain QoS routing to decide whether it is necessary to
maintain a link with a neighboring AS or not. Integrating a
double reputation mechanism – both for end-users and for
ASes – would greatly improve the efficiency of inter-domain
QoS routing.
REFERENCES
[1] Isabel Amigo, Pablo Belzarena, Federico Larroca, and Sandrine Vaton.
Network bandwidth allocation with end-to-end QoS constraints and
revenue sharing in multi-domain federations. In Proceedings of the
7th International Workshop on Advanced Internet Charging and QoS
Technology (ICQT), pages 50–62, 2011.
[2] Emmanuelle Anceaume, Gilles Guette, Paul Lajoie-Mazenc, Nicolas
Prigent, and Valérie Viet Triem Tong. A privacy preserving distributed
reputation mechanism. In Proceedings of the IEEE International
Conference on Communications (ICC), pages 1951–1956, 2013.
[3] Gilles Bertrand, Samer Lahoud, Miklós Molnár, and Géraldine Texier.
Inter-Domain Path Computation with Multiple QoS Constraints, chap-
ter 8, pages 129–147. Nova Science Publisher, 2010.
[4] Gilles Bertrand, Samer Lahoud, Géraldine Texier, and Miklós Molnár.
A distributed exact solution to compute inter-domain multi-constrained
paths. In Proceedings of the 15th Open European Summer School and
IFIP TC6.6 Workshop (EUNICE), 2009.
[5] John Bethencourt, Elaine Shi, and Dawn Song. Signatures of reputation.
In Proceedings of Financial Cryptography and Data Security (FC),
pages 400–407, 2010.
[6] Cisco Visual Networking Index. White paper: Forecast and methodol-
ogy, 2014–2019, 2015.
[7] Costas Courcoubetis, Manos Dramitinos, George D. Stamoulis,
G. Blocq, Avi Miron, and Ariel Orda. Inter-carrier interconnection
services: QoS, economics and business issues. In Proceedings of the
IEEE Symposium on Computers and Communications (ISCC), 2011.
[8] Chrysanthos Dellarocas. Immunizing online reputation reporting sys-
tems against unfair ratings and discriminatory behavior. In Proceedings
of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC), pages 150–157,
2000.
[9] Romain Jacquet, Geraldine Texier, and Alberto Blanc. Sanp: An
algorithm for selecting end-to-end paths with QoS guarantees. In Pro-
ceedings of the IEEE Future Network and Mobile Summit Conference
(FutureNetworkSummit), pages 1–10, 2013.
[10] Romain Jacquet, Geraldine Texier, and Alberto Blanc. Computing end-
to-end QoS paths in the internet considering multiple alliances. In
Proceedings of the International Telecommunications Network Strategy
and Planning Symposium (NETWORKS), pages 1–6, 2014.
[11] Audun Jøsang, Roslan Ismail, and Colin Boyd. A survey of trust
and reputation systems for online service provision. Decision Support
Systems, 43(2):618–644, 2007.
[12] Sepandar D. Kamvar, Mario T. Schlosser, and Hector Garcia-Molina.
The EigenTrust algorithm for reputation management in P2P networks.
In Proceedings of the International World Wide Web Conference
(WWW), pages 640–651, 2003.
[13] Paul Lajoie-Mazenc, Emmanuelle Anceaume, Gilles Guette, Thomas
Sirvent, and Valérie Viet Triem Tong. Efficient distributed privacy-
preserving reputation mechanism handling non-monotonic ratings.
Technical Report https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01104837, IRISA,
2015.
[14] Paul Lajoie-Mazenc, Emmanuelle Anceaume, Gilles Guette, Thomas
Sirvent, and Valérie Viet Triem Tong. Privacy-preserving reputation
mechanism: A usable solution handling negative ratings. In Proceedings
of the IFIP WG 11.1 International Conference on Trust Management,
pages 92–108, 2015.
[15] Mohamed Lamine Lamali, Dominique Barth, and Johanne Cohen.
Reputation-aware learning for sla negotiation. In Proceedings of the
NETWORKING 2012 Workshops, pages 80–88. 2012.
[16] N. Le Sauze, A. Chiosi, R. Douville, H. Pouyllau, H. Lonsethagen,
P. Fantini, C. Palasciano, A. Cimmino, Peter Reichl, and Ivan Gojmerac.
ETICS: QoS-enabled interconnection for future internet services. In
Proceedings of the IEEE Future Network and Mobile SummitCconfer-
ence (FutureNetworkSummit), 2010.
[17] Michel Raynal. Consensus in synchronous systems: A concise guided
tour. In Proceedings of the Pacific Rim International Symposium on
Dependable Computing, pages 221–228, 2002.
[18] Paul Resnick, Richard Zeckhauser, Eric Friedman, and Ko Kuwabara.
Reputation systems. Communications of the ACM, 43(12):45–48, 2000.
[19] Ion Stoica, Robert Morris, David Liben-Nowell, David R. Karger,
Marinus Frans Kaashoek, Frank Dabek, and Hari Balakrishnan. Chord:
a scalable peer-to-peer lookup protocol for internet applications.
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, 11(1):17–32, 2003.
